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Abstract: 
Equity options have a significant influence on the price discovery process.  This paper 
presents unique evidence of substantial price clustering in individual equity options 
contracts. A particular contribution arises from investigating competing hypotheses on 
the roles of moneyness and maturity as determinants of option price clustering. We 
assert that options price clustering can be decomposed to price level, moneyness and 
maturity effects. After controlling for other factors, price clustering has an inverse 
relation with time to maturity. This supports the negotiation hypothesis, but not the 
price resolution hypothesis. Price clustering also tends to be inversely related to 
moneyness. This effect is linked to the intrinsic value component of option price. Both 
the maturity and moneyness effects act in an opposite direction to what would be 
anticipated on the basis of price level alone, hence these two effects are identified as 
additional influences on option price clustering. It is also found that the designated 
market maker scheme at NYSE Euronext-LIFFE has little influence on trade price 
clustering. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Price clustering refers to the non-uniform distribution of final price digits in financial 
assets and reflects the tendency of market participants to use a coarser set of prices 
than that dictated by minimum tick size restrictions. Theory suggests that price 
clustering in financial markets could be a function of price uncertainties (Ball et al., 
1985, Aitken et al., 1996), could arise from a need to minimise trade negotiation costs 
(Harris, 1991), or could reflect investors’ attraction to particular numbers (Goodhart 
and Curcio, 1991) and, given the existence of market makers, the tendency of the 
latter to maintain wider spreads (Christie and Schultz, 1994). In derivatives markets, 
empirical studies are mainly focused on the futures markets (e.g. ap Gwilym et al., 
1998a,b; Schwartz et al., 2004) and the sparse evidence on options contracts (ap 
Gwilym et al., 1998a; Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury, 2007; Cheng et al., 2005) is 
restricted to stock index contracts. Finally, Ni et al. (2005) show that option trading 
induces stock price clustering. In particular, the authors show that stock prices for 
optionable stocks cluster around option strike prices at expiration dates, altering stock 
returns only for stocks that have tradable options. It is found that hedge rebalancing 
and stock price manipulation contribute significantly to price clustering in the 
underlying stocks at option expiration dates. 
ap Gwilym et al. (1998a) report extreme price clustering in the FTSE100 index 
options contract traded at Euronext-LIFFE, which also tends to increase with price 
level. Low priced, out-of-the-money, near-to-mature contracts display less price 
clustering. Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury (2007) show that price clustering in the 
CAC40 index option contract increases with the price level. Their findings on the 
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effects of moneyness and maturity on price clustering are inconclusive.1 The findings 
of ap Gwilym et al. (1998a) and Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury (2007) offer more 
support for the attraction hypothesis than for other theories on price clustering. Cheng 
et al. (2005) report that quote and bid-ask spread clustering on the Hang Seng index 
futures and options decreased following a switch to electronic trading. The 
implementation of a relatively low tick size increased execution efficiency and 
transparency, allowing traders to use the full range of available prices. 
Individual equity options contracts have been repeatedly praised for their 
contribution to price discovery and are found to lead the process of reflecting new 
information in market prices (see Hull, 2008). This study offers an explanation of 
price clustering in individual equity option contracts that links price clustering with 
the intrinsic value and time value inherent in options. In contrast to equity markets, 
where price level is the key determinant of price clustering, we argue that 
determinants of options price clustering can be decomposed to price level, moneyness 
and maturity effects. It is hypothesised that price clustering in options contracts is the 
price of liquidity,2 which has very important implications for the price discovery 
process. This also offers an approach whereby the negotiation and price resolution 
hypotheses can be tested for options contracts.  
                                                 
1 In Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury (2007), clustering is positively related to maturity, but this is not 
statistically significant when the effect of a change in tick size is accounted for. The relation between 
clustering and moneyness is also insignificant after controlling for the effect of a change in tick size.  
2 The fact that price clustering can be modelled as a factor rather than the outcome of “order 
imbalances” is documented in McGroarty et al. (2007). They use foreign exchange data, and no such 
study exists for options markets. 
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We find that options price clustering is strongly influenced by options contract 
characteristics. Clustering is inversely related to maturity. Prices tend to be clustered 
for the short-maturity contracts, because the need to trade in options contracts 
increases as the expiry date approaches (particularly to close out positions prior to 
maturity or to rollover exposure to the next maturity). We suggest that a revised 
version of the negotiation hypothesis tends to better explain the price clustering-
maturity relationship in individual equity options than does the price resolution 
hypothesis. Price clustering also tends to be inversely related to moneyness. This 
effect is linked to the intrinsic value component of the option price, and specifically 
that less clustering occurs when valuation is less “hazy” (see Aitken et al., 1996). 
Both the maturity and moneyness effects act in an opposite direction to what would be 
anticipated on the basis of price level alone, hence these two effects are identified as 
additional influences on price clustering for options. Also, the designated market 
maker scheme at NYSE Euronext-LIFFE has little influence on price clustering.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section 
discusses our hypotheses for options price clustering. The “Data and Methodology” 
section outlines the data and methodological issues and the “Empirical Results” 
section presents and discusses the results. The “Conclusion” section summarises and 
concludes the paper. 
 
HYPOTHESES FOR PRICE CLUSTERING IN OPTIONS 
CONTRACTS 
According to the negotiation hypothesis (Harris, 1991), price clustering is the result of 
the trade-off between reduced negotiation costs and increased price transparency. 
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Also, the price resolution hypothesis (Ball et al., 1985) argues that price clustering is a 
function of the amount of information about the true price of the asset that is available 
in the market. Thus, the less information about the asset’s value, the more severe will 
be the degree of price clustering. The above hypotheses imply that rounding of traded 
and quoted prices can be seen as primarily dictated by price level; hence, it is 
generally accepted that price clustering is a positive function of the price level of 
assets, a finding that nests both the negotiation and the price resolution hypotheses.  
In equity markets, price clustering is one-dimensional with regard to this price 
level effect. In contrast, options prices have time value and intrinsic value 
components. Hence, in options markets, price clustering is multi-dimensional and has 
embedded time-specific characteristics. It is thus possible to determine an indirect 
time determinant of clustering, the importance of which lies in the fact that it cannot 
be captured by the price level effect. First, the specification of maturity dates for each 
option contract introduces the concept of a time-effect in price clustering. The further 
a contract is from maturity, the greater the time value (all else being equal). Hence, 
observed price clustering should adhere to a time based pattern, where longer to 
mature contracts display different clustering to near-to-mature contracts because, 
apart from the price level effect, greater information uncertainties are embedded in the 
longer to mature contracts. Second, options contracts that are deep-out-of-the-money 
essentially have only time-value, while in-the-money options are more valuable thus 
trade at higher price levels. As above, it is hypothesized that failing to treat 
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moneyness as separate from the price level effect leads to a crowding out of the 
separate influence of the variability in moneyness.3 
Based on the above considerations, the existing price clustering hypotheses 
should be regarded as insufficiently specific for options. In order to reflect options 
price clustering, there is a need to make important adjustments to the original 
hypotheses based on the maturity and moneyness elements. 
In option contracts, the negotiation hypothesis also has a time dimension. 
Given that European-style options can be exercised only at the expiration dates, the 
trading volume of an option contract is maximised on the expiration day. So, there is a 
climax of interest for these option contracts. On the other hand, for American-style 
options, such interest is more dispersed over time, and a trading peak, if such a peak 
exists, should be less pronounced. In Table I, we document that both volume and 
trading frequency increase as expiration approaches. The latter implies that under a 
volume-based explanation of price clustering, prices will cluster less for the shorter-
maturity contracts. On the other hand, the negotiation hypothesis assumes that traders 
will use a coarser set of prices as the urgency to trade increases (Harris, 1991). 
Consequently, because the negotiation cost hypothesis is associated with investors’ 
urgency to trade, an adjustment is made in the hypothesis and we expect to observe 
option prices to cluster more for short maturities.  
 
****Insert Table I about here*** 
                                                 
3 To some extent, this argument is related to Schwartz et al. (2004) where price clustering differences 
in front- and back-month futures contracts are found after controlling for the large differences in 
volume. However, the propositions in our study do not relate to trading volume as a dominant 
influence. 
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The price resolution hypothesis assumes that price clustering reflects the 
optimal degree of price resolution. For options, this implies that the approach of 
contract expiry and the resultant increased attention should improve the valuation of 
individual equity options. The underlying assumption for the above is that intrinsic 
value is a larger proportion of option price for short-maturity contracts than for longer 
maturities. In Table II, we decompose the option price to intrinsic value and time 
value. The intrinsic value (IV) component is calculated as the present value of the 
difference between the underlying asset price and the exercise (expressed as a 
proportion of the option price). The time value (TV) component is calculated as the 
difference between the present value of intrinsic value and the current option price.4 
Table II shows that, when controlling for the moneyness effect, IV is a higher 
proportion of the option price for the shorter-to-mature contracts. Consequently, under 
the price resolution hypothesis, price clustering should be less evident for the short 
maturity contracts, even after controlling for differences in the price level. We note 
that from Table I, a volume-based explanation would imply less clustering for out-of-
the-money options. 
 
****Insert Table II about here*** 
 
                                                 
4 The present value of the intrinsic value (IV) component is calculated as follows: IV = (ST – X)e-rT for 
calls and IV = (X - ST)e-rT for puts, where  ST refers to the underlying asset price, X is the exercise 
price, r is the risk-free rate (90 day T-Bill) and T is the days to maturity (divided by 365). This figure is 
then expressed as a proportion of the current option price. The time value (TV) component is calculated 
as the residual of the current option price less the intrinsic value.  
8 
 
 
 
Moneyness is reflected in the price level of options contracts. In-the-money 
options contracts trade at higher price levels (all else being equal), hence one might 
expect greater price clustering (as implied by Cheng at al., 2005). ap Gwilym et al. 
(1998) report that keeping maturity constant, less clustering is associated with in-the-
money index options. When moneyness is greater, the intrinsic value is a larger 
proportion of the option’s value (documented in Table II). This implies a greater 
certainty of value (or less ‘haziness’ as in Aitken et al, 1996), which could lead to less 
price clustering. This effect would be independent of the price level or any 
volume/liquidity considerations. 
The above main testable hypotheses are presented in Table III. The negotiation 
hypothesis implies that price clustering increases with trade size and price level 
(Harris, 1991). The price resolution hypothesis implies that greater information leads 
to less price clustering (Ball et al., 1985). In this paper, we assert that as maturity 
interacts with the price level, the negotiation and the price resolution hypotheses give 
opposite predictions about the nature of the relationship between price clustering and 
maturity. Hence, the negotiation hypothesis in options contracts implies that short 
maturity contracts will exhibit more clustering as a result of increased urgency to 
trade. On the other hand, the price resolution hypothesis predicts that assets close to 
maturity will be priced more reliably, hence, less price clustering is anticipated.  
Cheng et al. (2005) show that price clustering increases for in-the-money 
contracts, reflecting higher price levels. However, Cheng et al. (2005) use the option 
price instead of the underlying price as only an approximation to moneyness and fail 
to control for the price level effect in their model, hence this hypothesis can only be 
tentatively suggested as the most appropriate. In contrast, we hypothesize that as the 
intrinsic value of options increases for the more in-the-money options, price clustering 
9 
 
 
 
will decrease due to less price “haziness”, after controlling for the price level effect. 
Volume based explanations of the clustering-maturity and the clustering-moneyness 
relationships would be more consistent with Hypotheses 2a and 2b (as implied by 
Table I), i.e. positive signs would be expected. 
 
****Insert Table III about here*** 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Two high frequency datasets are employed. The first consists of all trades and quotes 
posted on individual equity option contracts at the NYSE-Euronext London 
International Financial Futures Exchange (Euronext-LIFFE) during 2005. Trading in 
Euronext-LIFFE is facilitated through LIFFE CONNECT®, an electronic market, 
which offers direct access for investors. Trading on LIFFE CONNECT® also occurs 
via designated market makers. The second dataset includes all trades and quotes 
posted on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) during 2005.5 The LSE data are 
supplied in CD format, whereas access to Euronext-LIFFE data is via NextHistory 
(online access by subscription). In order to control for stale and non-synchronous 
pricing problems, the most heavily traded assets are selected. Specifically, option 
assets that report more than 1500 trades during 2005 are selected, leading to a sample 
based on 28 equity options. In a similar manner to Chakravarty et al. (2004), for an 
asset that has traded more than 1500 times over the calendar year, all the 
                                                 
5 LSE trade data are appropriate for the calculation of the moneyness measure for equity options.  
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maturity/strike price contracts are included, which allows us to study price clustering 
across multiple moneyness and maturity levels.6,7 
 
****Insert Table IV about here*** 
 
Table IV presents the descriptive statistics for this dataset. The data are 
classified according to the minimum tick size. The maturity and moneyness effects 
stretch the price range of contracts from the minimum tick size to a maximum price of 
1332.5p.8 When the minimum tick is xx.25p, one would expect the following 
occurrence of price endings in descending order: xx.00, xx.50, (xx.75 and xx.25). For 
the options with a minimum tick size of xx.50p, price clustering in integers should be 
even more pronounced.  
                                                 
6 Thirty-one equity options met the criteria. Two firms were dropped from the sample owing to price 
distortions caused by restructuring. One firm was dropped due to ambiguous/conflicting information 
provided by Euronext-LIFFE and the LSE. In line with the definition of price clustering used, prices 
less than 50p are deleted from the sample.  
7 Screening out the most illiquid assets does not induce any sample selection bias, especially with 
regard to the inclusion of the further-to-mature and deep-in and deep-out of the money contracts. In 
fact, the sample that meets the transaction frequency criterion includes higher proportions of contracts 
with high moneyness levels and long maturity dates than the excluded assets (results available upon 
request). 
8 Summary statistics on the detailed distribution of prices taking into account all exercise prices and 
maturity dates would be unrealistic because the number of combinations of contracts in the dataset is 
greater than 17,000.  
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In order to evaluate the extent of price clustering in equity option contracts, 
the x2 goodness-of-fit test statistic is used. The statistic measures how well the 
observed prices reflect the expected last digit distribution and is computed as follows: 
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Where )( jin = number of observations at final digit )( ji  with k possible ticks. 
Under the hull hypothesis of no price clustering, x2 would give a value close to zero.  
In addition, a regression model based on hourly data is estimated to identify 
the determinants of price clustering in options contracts. The dependent variable, 
Clust, is the percentage of price observations at integers. In order to control for 
differences in the tick size, different regressions are estimated for the two tick sizes. 
Also, different regressions are employed for call and put options, as well as for quotes 
and trades, hence a total of eight regressions are estimated. 
We measure moneyness (MON) using the underlying stock prices as follows: 
 
Moneyness(calls) = (Si – Xi)Xi-1                                                                                   (2) 
 
Moneyness(puts) = -((Si – Xi)Xi-1)                                                                               (3) 
 
Where S is the contemporaneous price of the underlying stock. The 
denominator controls for the different price levels across option contracts.  
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The proxies for price level (PL) and trade size (TS) are the average trade price 
and trade size per hourly interval respectively (see ap Gwilym et al., 1998a). As price 
clustering is assumed to increase with the price level (PL), a positive relationship is 
anticipated. In contrast, the negotiation cost hypothesis implies that there is an inverse 
relationship between trade size (TS) and price clustering. Also, if larger firms are 
more efficiently priced, they will experience less price clustering (Harris, 1991). Firm 
size (FS) is proxied by each firm’s market capitalization, which is obtained from 
DataStream.  
The volatility (Vol) estimate is the standard deviation of the natural logarithm 
of returns per asset and should be positively related to price clustering (Harris, 1991). 
In general, the calculation follows the procedure introduced by Sheikh and Ronn 
(1994). Returns are calculated only for the at-the-money, nearest to mature contracts. 
The ask prices are used (see Bollerslev and Melvin, 1994). At each time interval, the 
first ask price is obtained. For the closing return calculation, the last ask price of the 
day is obtained. The closing ask price and the first ask quote of the next day are used 
for the computation of the opening returns. The procedure adopted is the following: at 
every hourly interval i the first ask price is obtained. Then, at the next hourly time 
interval i + 1, the ask price with the same strike price is obtained. The logarithmic 
return is calculated from these two prices. If however, there is no ask with the same 
strike price on the next interval i + 1, we search for the last available ask price in 
interval i with the required strike price. When the returns for the intervals i and i + 1 
are calculated, the same procedure is repeated for the next interval i + 2. Different 
strike prices can meet the ‘at-the-money’ criteria for a given contract in consecutive 
intervals, and this is accounted for. 
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Transaction frequency is used as a proxy of information asymmetries and 
should be negatively related to price clustering because higher frequencies will reveal 
more about the true value of the assets (Harris, 1991). TF is measured as the inverse 
square root of the number of transactions per day. 
A dummy variable is used to proxy for the liquidity schemes provided by 
Euronext-LIFFE (see also Anand and Weaver, 2006).9 The dummy variable (DMM) 
equals 1 if the contract is supported by both Designated and Primary Market Makers 
and 0 if the contract is only supported by Primary Market Makers. A negative 
coefficient for DMM would support the hypothesis that DMMs assist in price 
discovery i.e. that a finer price set is observed. 
ap Gwilym et al. (1998a) note that in the open outcry environment of (pre-
electronic trading) Euronext-LIFFE, price clustering might actually be inversely 
correlated with busy trading periods such as the open and close of the market. In order 
to test the above hypothesis in the hybrid trading structure of the equity options 
market, two dummy variables are introduced: the open dummy (OD) equals 1 at the 
opening interval (08:00 to 08:30) of the day and zero at all other times, and a closing 
dummy (CD) similarly constructed is used for the closing interval (15:30 to 16:25). 
The following model is estimated: 
 
                                                 
9 At Euronext-LIFFE, the continuity of quotes and competition in spreads is supported by Primary 
Market Makers. All individual equity options contracts are supported by a Primary Market Maker. 
Further, the Designated Market Maker Scheme intends to complement the Primary Market Makers. 
Their function is to provide spreads in generally larger quote sizes than are supported by Primary 
Market Makers (see Anand and Weaver, 2006). 
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Where i = firm, t = intraday interval, z = daily price, y = quote/trade, x = 
call/put. The dependent variable, Clustityx, is the percentage of price observations at 
integers at each hourly time interval t (t = 1,…2052), for i = 28 firms and is different 
for x = calls or puts and y = quotes or trades.10 As denoted by the subscripts, the 
independent variables are calculated as appropriate. MON is the average moneyness 
measure per contract at every interval; TTM is the time to maturity for options traded 
at each time interval; PL is the average trade price level at each time interval per 
contract; FS denotes the firm size as the natural log of market capitalization based on 
daily closing prices for each firm;  VOL denotes volatility for the at-the-money, 
nearest-to-mature contract; TS is the average trade size at each time interval per 
contract; DMM is the Designated Market Maker dummy; TF denotes the transaction 
frequency at each time interval as the inverse square root of the number of 
transactions per day for each call and put contract. OD and CD are the open and close 
dummies respectively.  
 
                                                 
10 Time intervals with no price data are omitted. The total number of intervals for the 28 firms is 
57,456, hence, there is substantial variability in the number of observations between the regressions 
(see Table IX). 
15 
 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This section documents the extent of price clustering in individual equity options. The 
first part gives a detailed description of the results at a univariate level, while the 
second part reports on the multivariate regression models.  
Univariate Analysis 
Table V presents information on the extent of price clustering in equity option 
contracts.11  
 
****Insert Table V about here*** 
 
It is clear that there is a substantial variation across individual assets and 
between quotes and trades. For assets with a minimum tick of xx.50, quote price 
clustering ranges from 51.79% to 80.22% and trade price clustering is between 
55.48% and 67.57%. For assets with a tick size of xx.25, quote price clustering varies 
from 26.26% to 40.88%.  For the trades, price clustering ranges from 28.84% to 
39.86%. The 
2  test statistic rejects the hypothesis of no trade price clustering for 19 
assets at the 95% significance level. For quotes, price clustering is statistically 
significant for 16 assets at the 95% level. 
Table VI, Panel 1, presents the distribution of xx.00 prices for all assets at both 
minimum tick sizes. For the small tick size (xx.25), clustering within the lowest 
quartile of price is 28.38% for quotes and 33.34% for trades, whereas for the largest 
quartile, clustering is 42.31% for quotes and 57.14% for trades. For the xx.50 tick 
                                                 
11 Throughout this paper an integer definition of price clustering is used.  
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size, quotes are clustered at 50.91% and 58.94% for quotes and trades for the smallest 
quartile respectively. For the largest quartile, clustering is 57.10% for quotes and 
67.48% for trades. 
 
****Insert Table VI about here*** 
 
For the xx.25 tick size, it is clear that Harris’ (1991) negotiation hypothesis 
holds, whereby price clustering increases substantially as the price level increases. 
This effect is more pronounced for trades. Thus, if excess price clustering is defined 
as excess percentage of integer prices over the optimal percentage,12 then excess trade 
clustering for a tick of xx.25 reaches 128% at the highest price levels. For the xx.50 
tick size, trades follow the same increasing clustering pattern, yet the excess 
clustering figure is 34%. The latter finding in Table VI might actually reflect the fact 
that the tick size is restricting and prohibits trades at a smaller price increment.  
Table VI, Panel 2, presents the distribution of price clustering at integers at 
different trade size quartiles. For the smaller tick size (xx.25), the results on quotes 
support the negotiation hypothesis, with price clustering at integers almost doubled 
for the largest size quartile. The negotiation theory also holds for quotes at the xx.50 
minimum tick, even though the difference for the largest size quartile is not as large as 
for the smaller tick. For trades, Table VI reports a different clustering pattern. In 
particular, for the tick size of xx.25, price clustering in integers decreases with trade 
size (see also Aitken et al, 1996), while for the larger tick, the negotiation hypothesis 
continues to hold (marginally).  
                                                 
12 Excess = ((% of clustering – uniform) / (uniform))*100. 
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Table VII presents data for price clustering on the expiration day, the week 
preceding the expiration day and the remaining dates. This distinction is made on the 
basis of the increase in volume and on the increased urgency to trade on the expiration 
date (see Table I and also Chung and Chiang, 2006). It is assumed that the build-up of 
interest is captured in the calendar week prior to the expiration day. Table VII shows 
that, when the tick is xx.25, price clustering peaks on the expiration day. Also, price 
clustering increases monotonically for quotes as the expiration day approaches and the 
x2 statistic captures this increasing trend. A similar finding applies for quotes under 
the xx.50 tick size. Trade price clustering for both tick sizes falls marginally in the 
expiration week.13 
 
****Insert Table VII about here*** 
 
Figure 1 presents the intraday clustering pattern for quotes and trades 
classified by different tick sizes. Figure 1a (for tick size of xx.25) is consistent with 
previous research on intraday patterns in price clustering (Ohta, 2006; Schwartz et al., 
2004). Quotes follow a typical U-shaped pattern. Trades also have a high level of 
clustering at the market open, but the pattern is more variable during the trading day. 
These high degrees of clustering at the market open are partially attributed to the price 
uncertainty that prevails (see Ohta, 2006). A different pattern is observed for the 
larger tick size (xx.50), as clustering for quotes at the market open is relatively low 
and increases during the first trading hour before it takes the standard U-shaped 
                                                 
13It is also found that price clustering on expiration Fridays is greater than for non-expiration Fridays 
(results not presented in the interests of brevity). 
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pattern for the remainder of the trading day. As with the smaller tick, trades are more 
clustered at the beginning of the day and other peaks are found during the trading day. 
 
****Insert Figure 1 about here*** 
 
Table VIII presents the percentages of integer price clustering across call/put 
and trade types classified by maturity and moneyness. Since at this point we do not 
control for the price level effect, we expect this effect to predominate. This is true 
when differences within maturities are considered. It is found that for the nearer-to-
maturity contracts, quote price clustering is strongly influenced by moneyness. Thus, 
prices for in-the-money contracts are more clustered than those for at-the-money 
contracts and prices for at-the-money contracts are more clustered than those for out-
of-the-money contracts. When maturity is more distant, the price clustering 
differences that are attributable to moneyness diminish. For the longest-to-mature 
contracts, price clustering levels are relatively consistent across differing moneyness. 
For trades, the evidence on this point is less consistent, but a moneyness effect is 
present in many cases.  
 
****Insert Table VIII about here*** 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
Results of the regression analysis are presented in Table IX. The first column 
indicates the hypothesised sign for each coefficient. In Table IX, when controlling for 
price level, MON is negative in six cases and statistically significant in four of eight 
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cases. This finding demonstrates that in-the-money contracts are less clustered than 
out-of-the money contracts, a finding that is not driven by the higher price level at 
which these contracts trade.14 We therefore show that the finding of Cheng et al. 
(2005) is mainly driven by the price level effect. Most importantly, the above finding 
confirms the intrinsic value hypothesis (see Table III). As the time value also reflects 
the speculative or “haziness” element of options values, clustering decreases with 
increasing moneyness. 
 
****Insert Table IX about here*** 
 
The time-to-maturity (TTM) variable is negatively associated with price 
clustering in every case. In particular, TTM is negative and highly significant for 
quotes, while, for trades, the same relationship is found, albeit significant for the 
larger tick size only. This is clearly in line with hypothesis 1a in Table III, implying 
that price clustering increases when the need to conduct trades is more urgent. In 
options markets, it is assumed that the urgency to trade increases as expiry 
approaches. 
The coefficient on PL is highly significant for quotes and for all trades at the 
xx.50 tick. These results support our view that maturity and moneyness effects 
influence the distribution of ending prices in options, and that these are separate 
effects from the price level. This is reinforced by the fact that price level is not a 
significant factor for trades at the smaller tick size. 
                                                 
14 The liquidity effect is also controlled for by TS (transaction frequency). 
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For firm size (FS) there are negative and strongly significant coefficients for 
all trades and quotes under the xx.50 minimum price increment. For the smaller tick, a 
significant negative relationship exists only for put trades.15 However, the latter might 
be explained by the fact that for firms trading at the smaller tick size, a Designated 
Market Maker is assigned for 67% of observations, while for the larger tick size, this 
percentage falls to 55%.  
There is a highly significant negative relationship between volatility and price 
clustering for quotes, which is in contrast with the previous literature on index options 
contracts. For trades, the coefficient on volatility is only significant for puts at the 
xx.25 tick size and this has the expected sign. 
The negotiation hypothesis also predicts that price clustering should decrease 
with the average trade size, reflecting the increased cost of utilising smaller price 
increments. The results reveal that for the xx.25 tick size, the negotiation hypothesis 
holds for both quotes and trades (in terms of the expected sign). For the larger tick 
size, a highly significant positive relationship is found for quotes and an insignificant 
relationship for trades.  
Table IX gives mixed results on the signs of the DMM coefficients. For the 
xx.50 tick size, quotes are generally less clustered when designated market makers are 
assigned to assets. For the xx.25 tick size, the coefficients for quotes are positive and 
highly significant. The latter implies that quote price clustering tends to be 
significantly higher at the smaller tick for assets participating in the DMM scheme. 
When trades are considered, the results are only significant for the xx.25 puts, 
                                                 
15 The average firm size is very similar for both tick sizes. 
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showing that there is a substantial decrease in price clustering when designated 
market makers are assigned.  
Transactions’ frequency is very important in trade price clustering, consistent 
with the information asymmetry hypothesis. There is a strong and highly significant 
positive relationship between price clustering and TF for all trades, reflecting the fact 
that market participants price assets more reliably by learning from previous trades 
(see Harris, 1991). The coefficients for quotes are not significant, which reflects the 
fact that quote frequency tends to be relatively consistent in this sample. 
The coefficients for the opening dummy (OD) are negative for quotes. 
However, the opposite is true in three cases for trades. The CD coefficients show that 
price clustering is strongly influenced by the market close. This tends to conflict with 
the pattern predicted by the negotiation hypothesis. While trade prices are more 
clustered at the market open, they are not affected by the market close; in contrast, 
quotes are less clustered at the market open for the xx.50 tick size (consistent with 
Figure 1).  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Individual equity options contracts have been repeatedly praised for their contribution 
to price discovery and are found to lead the process of accumulating new information 
in market prices (see Hull, 2008). However, as these contracts are often very low 
priced with a large minimum tick size, price clustering deteriorates the information 
content of trades. This is the first study of price clustering in individual equity options 
contracts. 
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Prior studies (albeit on index options) have implicitly assumed that, similar to 
equity markets, there is a clear-cut relationship between price clustering and the price 
level (ap Gwilym et al., 1998a, Capelle-Blancard and Chaudhury, 2007). In contrast, 
we argue that options price clustering can be decomposed to price level, moneyness 
and maturity effects. Also, as the price level effect nests both the negotiation 
hypothesis and the price resolution theory, the findings are of particular importance 
for contract design and for assessing the price discovery process. 
We assert that if the negotiation hypothesis holds, price clustering will 
increase close to expiry because of investors’ increased urgency to conduct trades. In 
contrast, if the price resolution hypothesis holds, price clustering will decrease (asset 
is more correctly priced) as the intrinsic value increases as a proportion of price. Thus, 
there is a testable application for the negotiation versus the price resolution 
hypotheses.  
For the relationship between price clustering and maturity, this paper’s 
findings provide clear support for the negotiation hypothesis. There is an inverse 
relation between price clustering and maturity, which validates the hypothesis that 
when the need to conduct a trade is greater than the costs associated with price 
clustering, market participants will tend to use a smaller set of prices. The latter is 
independent of the price level because when maturity approaches, the price level will 
fall, all else being equal.  
Price clustering also tends to be inversely related to moneyness. We argue that 
this moneyness effect is driven by an option’s intrinsic value component. When 
moneyness is greater, intrinsic value is a higher proportion of option price. An 
increased intrinsic value component implies a greater certainty in option value, thus 
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reducing price clustering. This element of the findings strongly supports the view that 
clustering decreases if valuation is less ‘hazy’ (Aitken et al, 1996).  
For the larger tick size, (xx.50) trade price clustering increases with firm size, 
however, when the minimum tick size is xx.25, a statistically significant relationship 
is only observed for put trades. Also, quote price clustering is significantly negatively 
related to volatility. Transaction frequency is strongly inversely related to clustering. 
Also, volume-based explanations of the relationship between price clustering and 
maturity/moneyness would lead to positive coefficients rather than the negative 
coefficients observed. The intraday clustering results show a higher level of clustering 
at the market open, which can be explained by information asymmetries that are 
accumulated overnight. The market close does not influence price clustering levels. 
There is mixed evidence on the influence of designated market makers on price 
clustering, with little impact evident in traded prices.  
The paper fills a notable gap in the literature on options price clustering. The 
maturity and moneyness dimensions of options contracts are explicitly investigated as 
potential determinants of price clustering. The findings have important implications 
for contract design as price clustering can distort cross-valuation of options and their 
underlying assets, deteriorating price efficiency in both markets.  
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Table I: Distribution of trade volume and trade frequency across moneyness levels and maturities 
  Moneyness 
  In At Out Total 
Maturity Volume Frequency Volume Frequency Volume Frequency Volume Frequency 
Nearest 213.07 7.78 1557.08 37.49 496.21 9.64 2266.36 54.90 
2nd Nearest 84.49 2.94 762.86 20.12 635.77 10.97 1483.11 34.02 
3rd Nearest 21.63 1.55 211.20 6.87 285.48 5.89 518.31 14.31 
4th Nearest 10.89 0.44 74.82 1.59 100.08 1.75 185.79 3.78 
Other 20.02 0.29 101.40 0.66 135.13 0.92 256.55 1.87 
Total 350.09 13.00 2707.36 66.72 1652.67 29.16 4070.12  108.88  
Note. Volume refers to the total number of contracts traded.  Frequency refers to the total number of trades. Figures are 
presented in thousands. Moneyness is calculated using equations 2 and 3. At-the-money (AT) options refer to prices that 
fall within the (-0.05, 0.05) moneyness range. 
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Table II: Present values of the intrinsic value as a percentage of option price 
  Option Type 
Maturity Moneyness Call Put 
Nearest 
   
DeepIn 91.65 77.28 
In 87.58 82.11 
At  23.87 22.69 
2nd Nearest 
   
DeepIn 88.55 77.45 
In 73.00 71.37 
At  11.20 13.28 
3rd Nearest 
  
DeepIn 80.71 68.48 
In 63.30 62.55 
At  9.52 10.32 
4th Nearest  
  
DeepIn 80.55 68.82 
In 63.96 66.23 
At  8.85 8.92 
Other  
  
DeepIn 73.43 73.81 
In 45.19 61.03 
At  4.92 8.34 
Note: For an explanation of how the IV component is calculated, see 
footnote 4. Moneyness is calculated using equations 2 and 3. At-the-
money options refer to prices that fall within the (-0.05, 0.05) moneyness 
range and in-the-money refers to options that fall within the [0.05, 0.15) 
range. Deep-in-the money options (DeepIn) refer to prices with 
moneyness greater than 0.15. The intrinsic value component of options is 
bounded below by zero. 
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Table III: Hypotheses for Price Clustering  
Hypotheses Effect 
Relation to Price 
Clustering 
1.  Negotiation (Harris, 1991) Trade size / price level + 
1a. Negotiation in options Maturity  - 
2. Price resolution (Ball et al., 1985) More information - 
2a. Price resolution in options Maturity + 
2b. Price resolution in options  (Cheng et al., 2005) Moneyness  + 
3. Intrinsic value Moneyness - 
Note: Trading volume based explanations of the clustering-maturity and the 
clustering-moneyness relationships would be consistent with Hypotheses 2a and 2b 
(as implied by Table I), i.e. positive signs would be expected. 
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Table IV: Descriptive Statistics 
Name Tick 
Trades Quotes 
N MAX MEAN STD N MAX MEAN STD 
OAWS 0.25 1716 98 15.30 12.66 1897211 150 22.81 12.11 
OBBL 0.25 5183 302 20.44 20.30 9605552 310 61.41 39.85 
OBTG 0.25 3994 59.75 9.01 8.34 3639392 101.25 21.73 15.52 
OSAN 0.25 2075 75 10.55 8.64 2177017 109.5 26.88 17.12 
OTCO 0.25 1999 86.25 13.20 11.55 1662975 103 26.90 18.32 
OVOD 0.25 5056 70.25 6.35 5.74 2775543 82.5 13.22 10.41 
OAAM 0.5 2382 748 63.83 72.14 3282337 1031.5 89.59 61.34 
OAZA 0.5 7873 928.5 74.30 74.79 14981191 1303.5 167.72 110.68 
OBLT 0.5 3371 242.5 36.41 30.94 2706553 291 63.02 39.75 
OBOT 0.5 2216 136 23.45 19.71 1476605 216 53.74 38.16 
OBP 0.5 6869 330.5 39.40 40.61 12240177 932.5 181.29 152.83 
OBSK 0.5 2716 182.5 19.38 18.98 1793260 183 48.31 36.40 
OCPG 0.5 1584 162 23.00 20.39 305136 250.5 32.51 20.78 
OCUA 0.5 3169 199 25.74 23.16 5159500 411.5 69.47 47.14 
OEMG 0.5 2558 682 67.29 69.85 2208592 682 86.04 54.17 
OGNS 0.5 3656 220 24.14 21.33 5267272 317.5 56.16 41.85 
OGXO 0.5 9516 621 40.53 36.41 8067020 761 72.97 48.17 
OHSB 0.5 5780 209.5 21.30 19.33 4543180 445.5 54.09 40.39 
OKGF 0.5 2434 152 24.03 20.40 717467 288 41.63 25.82 
OLS 0.5 1993 333 48.70 42.91 3526782 570.5 67.62 43.69 
OPRU 0.5 2833 206 31.17 28.14 6356484 560 111.02 77.89 
ORBS 0.5 8166 367 46.30 42.49 15620181 726 133.18 97.94 
ORTZ 0.5 5069 1001 77.56 90.24 6185706 1332.5 130.94 92.85 
ORUT 0.5 2151 218 31.50 25.73 3386466 380.5 81.38 62.76 
OSCB 0.5 2765 380.5 42.04 40.72 4101801 527 65.65 40.59 
OSPW 0.5 1938 162 19.17 17.59 740680 162 37.67 27.19 
OTSB 0.5 7224 320 31.68 31.59 4259098 572.5 81.24 62.09 
OTAB 0.5 2600 400 36.93 37.74 4520586 601.5 58.50 39.70 
Note. Mean refers to the average price per asset over the sample period. STD refers to standard deviation. 
Tick is also the minimum price over the sample period. 
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Table V: Percentage of Prices at Integer Values 
Panel 1 
  
   xx.50 
  Quote   Trade 
Name Obs. Perc. ChiSq Obs. Perc. ChiSq 
OAAM 2,349,257 71.57*** 18.62*** 1,554 65.24*** 9.29*** 
OAZA 8,547,309 57.05 1.99 5,265 66.87*** 11.39*** 
OBLT 2,171,328 80.22*** 36.54*** 2,084 61.82** 5.59** 
OBOT 1,121,677 75.96*** 26.96*** 1,380 62.27*** 6.03*** 
OBP 6,645,004 54.29 0.74 4,395 63.98*** 7.82*** 
OBSK 1,341,319 74.80*** 24.60*** 1,540 56.70 1.80 
OCPG 152,929 50.12 <0.01 955 60.29** 4.24** 
OCUA 2,700,364 52.34 0.22 1,845 58.22* 2.70* 
OEMG 1,447,848 65.56*** 9.68*** 1,697 66.34*** 10.68*** 
OGNS 2,936,996 55.76 1.33 2,080 56.89 1.90 
OGXO 4,869,642 60.36** 4.30** 5,764 60.57** 4.47** 
OHSB 2,536,838 55.84 1.36 3,207 55.48 1.20 
OKGF 490,055 68.30*** 13.40*** 1,641 67.42*** 12.14*** 
OLS 2,362,217 66.98*** 11.53*** 1,202 60.31** 4.25** 
OPRU 3,292,328 51.79 0.13 1,765 62.30*** 6.05*** 
ORBS 8,338,298 53.38 0.46 4,932 60.40** 4.32** 
ORTZ 3,948,658 63.84*** 7.66*** 3,425 67.57*** 12.34*** 
ORUT 2,062,673 60.91** 4.76** 1,297 60.30** 4.24** 
OSCB 2,729,508 66.54** 10.95** 1,648 59.60** 3.69** 
OSPW 560,749 75.71*** 26.43*** 1,124 58.00 2.56 
OTAB 2,653,830 58.71* 3.03* 1,490 57.31 2.14 
OTSB 2,542,998 59.71** 3.77** 4,530 62.71*** 6.46*** 
Total 65,801,825 59.04  . 54,820 61.69  . 
Panel 2 
  xx.25 
  Quote   Trade 
Name Obs. Perc. ChiSq Obs. Perc. ChiSq 
OAWS 545,424 28.75 2.08 648 37.76*** 12.96*** 
OBBL 3,478,005 36.21** 7.74** 2,069 39.92*** 15.67*** 
OBTG 960,743 26.40 0.29 1,254 31.40 3.58 
OSAN 770,567 35.40** 10.20** 759 36.58*** 10.91*** 
OTCO 680,379 40.91*** 20.19*** 622 31.12 4.35 
OVOD 741,775 26.73 0.37 1,478 29.23 1.50 
Total 7,176,893  32.89 . 6,830 34.15 . 
Note. Tick Size refers to the minimum price increment. The optimal distribution for tick of xx.25 (xx.50) 
is 25% (50%). ChiSq refers to the x2 test statistic. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. Perc. denotes percentage of prices at integers. 
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Table VI: Price and Size Level Clustering 
Panel 1: Price  
 
xx.25 
Quartile 
Quotes Trades 
Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc 
0 - 25 % 3,356,437 28.53 6,148 33.58 
26 - 75 % 3,627,129 38.03 678 39.65 
76 - 100 % 193,327 42.31 4 57.14 
  xx.50 
0 - 25 % 11,079,133 50.91 29,147 58.94 
26 - 75 % 35,928,104 63.29 22,975 64.88 
76 - 100 % 18,794,588 57.10 2,698 67.48 
Panel 2: Size  
 
xx.25 
Quartile 
Quotes Trades 
Obs. Perc Obs. Perc 
0 - 25 % 697,253 24.50 3,034 35.55 
26 - 75 % 2,597,285 26.47 1,862 34.25 
76 - 100 % 3,882,355 42.67 1,934 31.96 
  xx.50 
0 - 25 % 22,160,553 55.79 36,255 61.55 
26 - 75 % 32,404,712 58.92 12,240 61.42 
76 - 100 % 11,236,560 67.18 6,325 63.02 
Note. Perc. denotes percentage of prices at integers. 
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Table VII: Expiration Dates Clustering 
Tick xx.25 
Date/Type 
Quotes Trades 
Obs. Perc. ChiSq Obs. Perc. ChiSq 
Day 28,086 36.71 8.43** 72 38.50 29.49*** 
Week 402,572 35.24 7.20* 436 33.77 4.20 
Other 6,746,235 32.85 4.29 6,322 34.09 6.25 
  xx.50 
Day 229,940 63.10 6.86*** 447 58.66 3.00* 
Week 3,478,820 62.69 6.44*** 3,361 58.38 2.81* 
Other 62,093,065 58.84 3.12* 51,012 61.95 5.71** 
Note. Perc. denotes percentage of prices at integers. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table VIII: Price Clustering by Tick Size, Option Type, Trade Type, Maturity and Moneyness 
Note. Perc. denotes percentage of prices at integers. 
 
xx.25  xx.50 
  
Option Type Option Type 
Call Put Call Put 
Quotes Trade Quotes Trade Quotes Trade Quotes Trade 
Maturity Moneyness Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. Obs. Perc. 
Nearest 
In 990,371 39.25 369 32.86 927,694 42.94 218 35.68 6,759,456 67.98 2,675 66.61 5,303,801 71.64 1,345 66.19 
At 357,952 29.15 1,265 34.41 339,108 29.43 1,028 34.01 5,103,958 61.28 10,154 60.97 4,990,470 61.78 8,673 61.36 
Out 63,854 26.63 263 31.09 71,893 30.22 220 31.34 809,246 51.76 1,965 57.66 925,540 51.20 2,693 57.54 
2nd 
Nearest 
In 799,587 37.13 122 36.97 712,171 38.74 116 33.53 4,959,877 61.52 789 63.17 3,896,796 63.91 680 67.19 
At 361,788 29.36 569 32.64 324,310 29.09 690 35.77 4,603,614 59.02 5,189 61.97 4,296,775 59.48 5,086 63.01 
Out 139,477 27.24 387 35.47 125,439 26.38 206 32.85 1,682,082 53.52 2,549 59.79 1,786,633 52.93 3,024 60.65 
3rd 
Nearest 
In 352,536 33.95 61 34.66 281,690 34.72 78 38.24 2,391,400 57.33 335 58.26 1,818,366 58.71 388 65.10 
At 190,858 27.07 225 30.99 158,058 26.42 278 37.12 2,412,592 57.47 1,559 61.79 2,077,089 57.61 1,844 64.14 
Out 104,129 26.08 143 31.50 95,311 25.86 154 28.73 1,344,942 54.34 1,366 61.26 1,352,489 53.46 1,658 62.17 
4th 
Nearest 
In 139,817 25.42 16 30.77 89,216 26.25 25 32.89 1,128,312 49.93 91 60.26 759,568 50.05 105 65.22 
At 53,061 26.06 60 38.96 46,472 26.45 50 36.76 703,336 50.23 419 63.58 585,458 50.28 395 62.01 
Out 41,074 25.27 56 43.41 43,541 25.59 91 46.67 434,870 50.11 447 63.58 416,606 50.06 453 62.74 
Other 
In 102,889 26.39 13 43.33 74,770 26.32 12 19.35 1,513,260 50.08 67 60.91 1,134,503 49.98 53 58.89 
At 47,344 26.54 26 38.81 40,209 26.97 25 40.32 728,352 50.09 171 68.13 574,630 49.93 183 65.12 
Out 55,775 27.28 30 36.59 46,499 27.41 34 39.53 768,087 50.22 163 53.44 539,717 50.19 301 67.19 
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Table IX: OLS Regressions by Tick Size, Option and Trade Type 
 
Quotes Trades 
xx.25 xx.50 xx.25 xx.50 
Call Put Call Put Call Put Call Put 
Intercept (.) 13.73*** -3.88** 90.37*** 88.58*** 7.95 23.58*** 48.01*** 40.34*** 
  13.59 -2.72 91.98 111.67 1.41 3.10 18.70 15.97 
MON (+ vs. -) -57.43*** -54.08*** 7.48** 1.53 -48.73*** -1.46 -3.36*** -4.48 
  -17.56 -12.44 1.93 1.16 -3.34 -0.08 -2.47 -1.06 
TTM (+ vs. -) -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01*** -0.01*** 
  -39.05 -31.25 -71.00 -95.15 -0.59 -1.42 -4.97 -2.65 
PL (+) 0.59*** 0.67*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05 -0.09* 0.04*** 0.04*** 
  43.86 48.45 14.75 27.95 1.06 -1.74 8.18 7.35 
FS (-) 4.71*** 7.27*** -1.39*** -1.21*** -0.28 -2.63** -1.27*** -0.61** 
  33.60 35.00 -10.65 -12.75 -0.35 -2.47 -4.59 -2.36 
Vol  (+) -132.87*** -167.45*** -19.56*** -11.85*** 12.84 77.74*** -0.15 0.23 
  -24.66 -28.66 -18.00 -10.12 0.51 2.95 -0.04 0.06 
TS (-) -3.25E-03 -0.01*** 0.18*** 0.19*** -0.01** -0.01 4.05E-03 0.01 
  -1.39 -4.86 18.29 40.44 -2.10 -1.51 0.66 1.19 
DMM (-) 23.10*** 32.12*** -4.09*** -5.88*** 0.46*** -19.20*** 0.66*** -1.03*** 
  19.51 22.25 -11.76 -15.45 0.08 -2.98 0.57 -0.77 
TF (+) -0.26 0.09 0.17 -0.07 91.01*** 93.88*** 61.77*** 62.63*** 
  -1.23 0.42 1.25 -0.54 49.64 50.30 89.51 89.03 
OD (.) -0.64** -0.29 -3.42*** -3.21*** 3.29 4.07** -0.40 1.97*** 
  -2.00 -0.89 -15.03 -14.37 1.45 1.94 -0.56 2.73 
CD (.) 0.12 0.20 0.12 -0.01 -0.74 0.14 0.30 0.58 
  0.52 0.80 0.78 -0.05 -0.55 0.12 0.54 1.07 
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R-Squared 0.37 0.43 0.31 0.32 0.53 0.58 0.34 0.35 
No. of Obs. 12202 12210 44384 44401 2068 1998 13330 13585 
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

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 
 
Note. Where i = option contract, t = intraday interval, z = daily price, y = quote/trade, x = call/put. Clustityx, is the percentage of 
trades at integers at each time interval t (t = 1, 2, …2052),  for i = 28 contracts and is different for x = calls and puts and y = quotes and 
trades. MON is the average moneyness measure per contract at every interval; TTM is the average time to maturity for options traded at 
each time interval; PL is the average trade price level at each time interval per contract;  FS denotes the firm size as the natural log of 
market capitalization per day for each contract; VOL denotes volatility for the at-the-money, nearest-to-mature contract; TS is the 
average trade size at each time interval per contract; DMM is the Designated Market Maker dummy; TF denotes the transaction 
frequency at each time interval as the inverse square root of the number of transactions per day for each call and put contract. OD and 
CD are the open and close dummies respectively. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics are 
reported (based on Newey-West HAC standard errors). Predicted sign in parentheses. (+ vs. -) denotes competing hypotheses being 
tested. 
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Figure 1: Intraday Clustering Pattern by Tick Size 
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